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Freedom for All? Blacks, Jews, and the Political 
Censorship of White Racists in the Civil Rights Era*
C l i v e  W e b b
it lasted only a minute, but elicited a more impassioned public reaction 
than any other political broadcast aired in the South during the early 
1970s. During the first days of August 1972, television audiences across 
Georgia witnessed the sight of a man in a dark suit and bow tie sitting 
at a desk with a large Confederate battle flag hanging behind him and 
a smaller version folded in the front pocket of his jacket. The heavy-
lidded eyes that stared intently into the camera lens lent him a reptilian 
appearance and his heavily accented voice was slow and deliberate. “i 
am J. b. Stoner,” he announced. “i am the only candidate for U.S. Sena-
tor who is for the white people. i am the only candidate who is against 
integration. All of the other candidates are race mixers to one degree 
or another.” Stoner identified the policies of the moderate incumbent, 
Senator David H. Gambrell, as a particular threat to the racial purity of 
white voters. Then the aspirant for public office uttered the words that 
precipitated a political shockwave. “The main reason why niggers want 
integration is because the niggers want our white women. i am for law 
and order with the knowledge that you cannot have law and order and 
niggers too. vote white.”1 
The commercial was the centerpiece of a radically racist campaign by 
Stoner, a man described by one scholar as “the patriarch of the white 
supremacist movement.”2 His manifesto pledged that if elected he would 
“stop race mixing insanity” by cutting off funds for busing and other 
federal initiatives to facilitate school desegregation, restricting the access 
of “lazy drunken blacks” to public housing and welfare, and campaigning 
for the repeal of civil rights legislation. Stoner also committed himself 
* The author expresses appreciation to the following scholars for their helpful critical 
advice on this article: Mark K. bauman, Robert J. Cook, Richard Follett, David J. Garrow, 
Kathleen Kendall, Kevin M. Kruse, Samuel Walker, and Stephen J. Whitfield.
1. Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 3, 1972. A recording of the advertisement (item iD 45086) 
is available from the Julian P. Kanter Political Commercial Archive, Political Communica-
tions Center, University of Oklahoma, Norman.
2. Arthur e. Gerringer, Terrorism: From One Millenium To The Next (lincoln, Ne: 
Writers Club Press, 2002), 222. 
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to secure a federal law for the forcible repatriation of blacks to Africa, 
a controversial policy even a century earlier.3 
Stoner’s campaign commercial posed liberals with an ethical dilemma. 
The debate about how best to respond to its broadcast raged not only 
among local activists but across the country. in order to protect the con-
stitutional rights of all citizens, was it appropriate to defend the freedom 
of speech of every individual, even those who used that right to preach 
hatred and intolerance? Some concluded that it was. in their opinion, no 
matter how abhorrent the statements made by Stoner, he had as much 
right as any other citizen to freedom of speech under the First Amend-
ment. The American Civil liberties Union (AClU), whose libertarian 
philosophy had led it to defend the constitutional rights of white racists 
throughout the civil rights struggle, issued a statement supporting Stoner’s 
right to unrestricted freedom of speech.4
However, black and Jewish activists reacted with particular indignation 
to the race-baiting language used in the commercial. Access to television 
and radio was of crucial strategic importance to an extremist candidate like 
Stoner. in contrast to mainstream political and civic leaders, he possessed 
limited resources and relied on the publicity provided by media coverage 
to reach out to the electorate. Civil rights organizations well understood 
that restricting his access to the airwaves promised to curtail his campaign. 
Accordingly, black and Jewish civil rights activists launched a collective 
campaign to silence Stoner. The National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People (NAACP) and the Anti-Defamation league of b’nai 
b’rith (ADl) filed a joint complaint with the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), arguing that Stoner’s public address was not only 
offensive, but also intended to incite violence against African Americans. 
The organizations asked that the FCC prohibit further broadcasts by 
Stoner in the interests of public decency and safety.
Pressure on the FCC mounted as other civil rights groups added their 
voices to the chorus of protest against the Stoner campaign commercial. 
The Georgia Council on Human Relations and the Atlanta Community 
Coalition on broadcasting both issued statements supporting the peti-
tion of the NAACP and ADl. Atlanta Mayor Sam Massell also issued 
3. “vOTe FOR The White People’s Candidate J. b. Stoner / The White Racist For United 
States Senator From Georgia / STOP RACe MiXiNG iNSANiTY,” campaign pamphlet, 
box 29, folder 15, Oscar Cohen Papers (hereafter cited as “Cohen Papers”), manuscript 
collection 294, Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati; 
“Stop busing: vote for J. b. Stoner for U.S. Senator,” campaign pamphlet, American Jew-
ish Committee Antisemitic and extremist Collection, Jacob and Hilda blaustein Human 
Relations library, New York (hereafter cited as AJC Collection).
4. Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 4, 1972.
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a statement condemning the commercial and encouraged television and 
radio stations not to broadcast it. Hopes were high that the FCC would 
ban Stoner from using racist language on the airwaves.5 
This essay assesses both the causes and impact of the 1972 protests 
against the Stoner campaign commercial. The attempt to ban further 
broadcasts represented an important chapter in the long and complicated 
history of civil rights organizations’ policies on how to deal with hate 
speech. During the interwar era in particular, black and Jewish groups 
had both supported regulating the free speech of white racists. Since the 
intensification of the black freedom struggle in the late 1950s, however, 
they had for a number of ideological and strategic reasons refrained from 
legally campaigning for restrictions on hate speech. 
Civil rights activists certainly spoke out in strong condemnation of 
hate speech and hate symbols such as burning crosses and the Confeder-
ate battle flag.6 There was nonetheless an important distinction between 
mobilizing public opposition to the words and actions of white racists 
and using the power of law to prohibit them. While the moral case was 
clear, legally and politically the situation was more complex. black and 
Jewish groups were especially worried that their attempts to prohibit racist 
propaganda would prove counterproductive. First, they feared that hate 
peddlers would actually gain greater exposure by publicizing themselves 
as victims of an insidious campaign to deny them their constitutional 
rights. Second, civil rights activists understood that their own ability to 
march and demonstrate relied on a broad reading of First Amendment 
rights by the courts. Restricting speech by white racists that others might 
find offensive could ironically rebound on the civil rights movement, al-
lowing the courts to apply the same narrow interpretation of the First 
Amendment to civil rights protesters, seriously curtailing their capacity 
to protest against racial injustice. For these reasons, civil rights organiza-
tions had often eschewed direct challenges to hate speech.
in the autumn of 1972, black and Jewish activists nonetheless became 
embroiled in a very public controversy over the constitutional rights of 
hate speakers. Much of the historical scholarship on hate speech focuses 
on the Skokie affair, when members of the National Socialist Party of 
America attempted to organize a march through a Chicago suburb that 
was home to a large Jewish community that included many Holocaust 
survivors. Consistent with its belief in the unrestricted constitutional liber-
5. Atlanta Journal, Aug. 4, 1972; Charleston (Wv) Gazette, Aug. 4, 1972; Billings 
(MT) Gazette, Aug. 3, 1972.
6. See, for instance, Robert J. Cook, Troubled Commemoration: The American Civil 
War Centennial, 1961–1965 (baton Rouge: louisiana State University Press, 2007), 167. 
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ties of all citizens, the AClU sued for the right of the National Socialist 
Party to march in Skokie. Jewish defense groups, reacting to grassroots 
pressure, filed suit to ban the march on the grounds that it would incite 
violence. Although the Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment rights 
of the National Socialists, the march through Skokie never actually took 
place.7 While numerous scholars have analyzed the Skokie affair, hardly 
any have attempted to situate it within a broader historical narrative 
of civil rights groups’ strategy on hate speech. The Stoner incident has 
received little attention but is historically significant since it occurred five 
years earlier than the events in Skokie and anticipated what would later 
prove an acrimonious debate over whether or not white racists were 
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.
Jesse benjamin Stoner Jr. had established a reputation as one of the 
most notorious antisemites and racists in the United States long before the 
7. See, for example, Donald Alexander Downs, Nazis in Skokie: Freedom, Community, 
and the First Amendment (Notre Dame, iN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985); and 
Philippa Strum, When the Nazis Came to Skokie: Freedom for Speech We Hate (lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1999). 
Fig. 1. Portrait of J. b. Stoner, undated. Mississippi 
State Sovereignty Commission photograph, courtesy 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
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Fig. 2. An undated leaflet showing how Stoner and the National States’ Rights 
Party painted Jews as radicals who were the real power behind the black freedom 
struggle. From the Jewish Community Relations Council of Minnesota Collection, 
Minnesota Historical Society.
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public outcry created by his 1972 senatorial campaign. He was born on 
April 13, 1924, into a wealthy family in Walker County in northwestern 
Georgia, close to the Tennessee border. Stoner’s childhood was marred by 
tragedy. At the age of only two-and-a-half, he suffered an attack of polio 
that crippled one of his legs. Shortly thereafter, his father died. by the 
time Stoner was seventeen, he had also lost his mother to cancer. These 
setbacks did not inhibit his ambition and he enthusiastically pursued 
a career in law, graduating from the Atlanta law School and gaining 
admittance to the Georgia bar in 1951.8 
by that time, Stoner had already embarked on a parallel career as 
a representative of the far right. in 1942, the eighteen-year-old Stoner 
became a member of the Association of Georgia Klans. From the outset, 
Stoner stood out even among his fellow white supremacists for the rabidity 
of his racial and religious prejudices. During the 1930s and 1940s, white 
southern newspaper editors and political leaders saw no contradiction in 
denigrating Nazi racial ideology while defending Jim Crow. Stoner, by 
contrast, was a self-confessed fascist who considered the racial systems 
of Nazi Germany and the American South to be branches from the same 
tree.9 His admiration for Hitler stemmed from a fervent antisemitism. 
Stoner was at odds with most southern segregationists in having a greater 
animus toward Jews than African Americans. The authors of one study 
of political fanaticism go so far as to suggest that he was “perhaps the 
most outspoken and obsessive antisemite in American history.”10 Con-
vinced that communist Jews had duped the United States into fighting 
on the wrong side in World War ii, Stoner filed a petition with the U.S. 
House of Representatives, urging its members to approve a resolution 
that “Jews are the children of the devil” and should be expelled from 
the country. in 1945, he also established an independent organization, 
the Stoner Anti-Jewish Party.11
8. White Extremist Organizations, Part II: National States Rights Party (unpublished 
monograph, May 1970), 5, National States Rights Party, Federal bureau of investigation 
File; John George and laird Wilcox, American Extremists: Militias, Supremacists, Klans-
men, Communists, & Others (Amherst, NY: Prometheus books, 1996), 354. 
9. For further insight into the hypocritical attitude of southern segregationists toward 
Nazism, see Johnpeter Horst Grill and Robert l. Jenkins, “The Nazis and the American South 
in the 1930s: A Mirror image?” Journal of Southern History 58 (Nov. 1992): 667–94.
10. George and Wilcox, American Extremists, 354.
11. George Thayer, The Farther Shores of Politics: The American Political Fringe Today 
(london: Allen lane, 1968), 35–36; “Activities of the Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the 
United States,” Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 89th 
Congress, 2d session (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), part 5, 
3806–7, 3809–10; Michael Newton, The Invisible Empire: The Ku Klux Klan in Florida 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 116.
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Stoner’s political activities assumed a new intensity in reaction to the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, outlawing 
segregation in public schools. Stoner believed that African Americans 
possessed neither the intelligence nor enterprise to coordinate a mass 
protest movement against white supremacy. He therefore concluded that 
a cabal of communist Jews was responsible for the civil rights protests 
that shook the southern states in the years following Brown. According 
to Stoner, “the negro is not the enemy. The Jew is THE enemy of our 
White Race and the Jew is using the negro in an effort to destroy the 
White Race that he so passionately hates.”12
Stoner attempted to defend white supremacy through the National 
States’ Rights Party (NSRP), a militant segregationist organization that 
he helped found in 1958. During the next decade, the NSRP was linked 
to numerous attacks on black and Jewish institutions, including a bomb-
ing campaign against southern synagogues. A group calling itself “The 
Confederate Underground” targeted seven Jewish communities between 
November 1957 and October 1958. In three cities—Charlotte; Gastonia, 
North Carolina; and Birmingham—the bombs failed to explode, but the 
bombers succeeded in damaging Jewish institutions in Miami, Nashville, 
Jacksonville, and Atlanta. In the bombing of The Temple, the leading 
Reform congregation in Atlanta, there was strong circumstantial evidence 
of NSRP involvement, although prosecutors failed to win a conviction of 
five menbers of the organization who were put on trial. Still, the Atlanta 
bombing brought home to local civil rights activists the danger represented 
by groups such as the NSRP and informed their later anxieties about 
Stoner and the potential impact of his campaign commercial.13 Stoner 
was also personally responsible for the bombing in 1958 of the Bethel 
Baptist Church in Birmingham, whose pastor was the fearless black civil 
rights activist Fred Shuttlesworth. It took more than two decades before 
the authorities finally brought Stoner to justice for that crime.14 
In the intervening years, Stoner relentlessly pursued his hate campaign 
against racial and religious minorities. He helped lead the violent resis-
tance to civil rights demonstrations in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1964 
and Bogalusa, Louisiana, the following year.15 He was also active as a 
12. J. B. Stoner, “The Philosophy of “White Racism,”’ (n.d.), J. B. Stoner File, AJC 
Collection.
13. Clive Webb, Fight Against Fear: Southern Jews and Black Civil Rights (Athens and 
London: University of Georgia Press, 2001), 55–56.
14. New York Times, May 14 and 16, 1980; Washington Post, Aug. 14, 1982; May 
12 and Jun. 3, 1983.
15. For more on Stoner’s role in directing white resistance to black demonstrators in these 
communities, see David R. Colburn, Racial Change and Community Crisis: St. Augustine,
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lawyer representing numerous defendants accused of racially motivated 
crimes against African Americans. Most notoriously, in 1969 he served as 
a defense counsel for the murderer of Dr. Martin luther King Jr., James 
earl Ray.16 Although the terrorist attacks on southern synagogues had 
ceased by the late 1950s, Stoner continued accusing Jews of mastermind-
ing the civil rights movement and he produced a stream of antisemitic 
publications including Christ Not a Jew and Jews Not God’s Chosen 
People.17
Throughout his political career, Stoner demonstrated a flair for the 
inflammatory rhetoric that aroused such controversy during his senato-
rial campaign. in the aftermath of the genocide committed during World 
War ii, explicitly racist ideology, already on the wane, lost much of its 
intellectual and cultural legitimacy in the United States. Segregationist 
leaders increasingly refrained from defending Jim Crow in terms of white 
supremacy and black inferiority, emphasizing instead the more racially 
neutral language of states’ rights.18 Stoner, by contrast, revelled in a more 
atavistic rhetoric that denied the essential humanity of African Americans 
and advocated the use of extralegal violence to enforce white hegemony. 
“The nigger is not a human being,” he exclaimed at a white supremacist 
rally in 1965. “He is somewhere between the white man and the ape. 
We don’t believe in tolerance. We don’t believe in getting along with our 
enemy, and the nigger is our enemy.”19
Although the 1972 petition filed by the ADl and NAACP represented 
the first coordinated effort by civil rights groups to silence Stoner, news-
papers and politicians had sporadically raised the issue of whether he 
was entitled to unrestricted freedom of speech throughout his career. 
As early as 1946, author earl Conrad called on federal authorities to 
curtail distribution of postcards printed by the Stoner Anti-Jewish Party, 
stressing that although Allied forces had defeated the Axis powers, the 
1877–1980 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); and Adam Fairclough, Race 
& Democracy: The Civil Rights Movement in Louisiana, 1915–1972 (Athens: University 
of Georgia Press, 1995), 344–80.
16. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 24, Mar. 30, Apr. 8, and May 27, 1969.
17. J. b. Stoner, Christ Not a Jew and Jews Not God’s Chosen People (Marietta, GA: 
Thunderbolt, n.d.), copy in Hargrett Rare book and Manuscript library, University of 
Georgia, Athens.
18. The attempt by massive resistance to moderate their language in order to promote 
the public respectability of their cause is discussed in numerous works, including David 
Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004); and George lewis, Massive Resistance: The 
White Response to the Civil Rights Movement (london: Hodder, 2006).
19. “Activities of the Ku Klux Klan Organizations in the United States,” Part 5, 
3821.
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fight against domestic fascism remained unfinished.20 in 1963, Montana 
Senator lee Metcalf contacted the U.S. postmaster general to ask whether 
the federal government had the authority to restrict circulation of hate 
literature such as the NSRP’s newsletter, The Thunderbolt. The answer, 
to his presumed disappointment, was no.21 
These earlier initiatives notwithstanding, the attempt to suppress the 
Stoner campaign commercial signalled a change in policy on the part of 
civil rights activists who had previously advocated an expansive interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech. it is essential to 
contextualize the controversy over the Stoner commercial by first provid-
ing an overview of how African American and Jewish organizations had 
historically handled the contentious issue of hate speech. 
Civil rights organizations had on occasion challenged the right to free-
dom of expression when it resulted in racially derogatory representations 
of African Americans. Most notably, the NAACP had protested movie 
theater screenings of the D. W. Griffith film The Birth of a Nation because 
of its depiction of hypersexualized black males preying upon unsuspect-
ing white women. black demonstrations occurred both during the initial 
distribution of the film in 1915 and on its reissue shortly after World War 
ii. The protests had a mixed impact: while some theaters withdrew the 
film, the controversy also attracted curious audiences.22 Moreover, during 
the era of mass civil disobedience by blacks in the 1950s and 1960s, civil 
rights organizations for a number of strategic reasons retreated from ef-
forts to legally censor white racists. While the civil rights movement was 
dedicated to the eradication of all forms of racial discrimination, several 
factors made it a difficult problem to confront directly.
The first of these factors was a realization by civil rights activists 
that for the courts to impose limitations on the freedoms of speech 
and association would compromise their own cause. Restrictions on 
First Amendment rights in the United States have historically served the 
political interests of conservative elites that sought to suppress any chal-
lenge to their hegemony. The curtailment of free speech as a means to 
20. Chicago Defender, Oct. 26, 1946.
21. Senator lee Metcalf to Postmaster General J. edward Day, Jun. 12, 1963; louis J. 
Doyle to Senator lee Metcalf, Jul. 5, 1963, both in box 246, Group Research Archives, 
Rare book and Manuscript library, Columbia University.
22. David W. blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory (Cam-
bridge, MA: belknap Press of Harvard University, 2001), 395–96; Martha biondi, To Stand 
and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York City (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003), 95–97; Harry M. benshoff and Sean Griffin, America 
on Film: Representing Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality at the Movies (Malden, MA: 
blackwell, 2004), 78.
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silence the dissenting voices of those seeking social and political change 
occurred consistently from the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, through 
the repressive policies of the plantation elite in the antebellum South, to 
the Palmer raids on the radical left following World War i. Traditionally, 
it is the politically less powerful who campaign for greater freedom of 
speech as a means to gain equality.23 
This is certainly true of the black freedom struggle. The civil rights 
revolution that occurred in the decades following World War ii relied 
on the readiness of the federal judiciary to accord demonstrators the 
protections of the First Amendment. The success of the black political 
protests of the 1950s and 1960s depended in part on the safeguarding 
of speech interpreted by some as inflammatory and offensive. Southern 
law-enforcement officers used the accusation of incitement to assault 
and arrest civil rights demonstrators. However, the courts continually 
ruled that these attempts to restrict freedom of speech amounted to 
unconstitutional acts of censorship. The efforts of African Americans to 
gain the civil rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments therefore relied on the enforcement of the civil liberties granted by 
the First Amendment. As former AClU chief ira Glasser observes, civil 
rights activists consequently “saw equality and free speech as mutually 
reinforcing, twin pillars of a singular value system.”24 
One illustration of how an expansive interpretation of First Amend-
ment rights facilitated civil rights protest is the student sit-ins of 1960. 
When violence broke out during various demonstrations, law enforcement 
officers arrested the students for provoking disorder by intruding on 
private property. NAACP lawyers attempted to overturn the convictions 
by claiming that the sit-ins represented something more significant than 
a simple case of trespass or breach of the peace. The First Amendment, 
they insisted, permitted the students to protest publicly against racial 
segregation. While their acts were provocative, the use of violence to 
suppress the protests represented an infringement of their constitutional 
rights. The Supreme Court agreed. between 1961 and 1965, it over-
turned the convictions of numerous student demonstrators. in the two 
most important of these cases, Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) and 
Cox v. Louisiana (1965), the Court established that even the threat of 
23. For further discussion of historical restrictions on free speech, see Christopher M. 
Finan, From the Palmer Raids to the Patriot Act: A History of the Fight for Free Speech 
in America (boston: beacon Press, 2007).
24. ira Glasser, “introduction,” in Henry louis Gates Jr., Anthony P. Griffin, Donald 
e. lively, Robert C. Post, William b. Rubenstein, and Nadine Strossen, Speaking of Race, 
Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (New York and london: 
New York University Press, 1994), 2.
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imminent violence from a hostile audience was insufficient grounds for 
the suppression of constitutionally protected speech.25
The commitment of the Supreme Court to facilitate civil rights protest 
also led to its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan that the First Amend-
ment protection of free speech necessitated a higher criterion of proof 
in libel actions brought by public figures. Many news organizations had 
at first been reluctant to report candidly on the repression of civil rights 
protest in the South for fear that southern public officials would sue them 
for libel. The enhancement of First Amendment protections in the case 
led to more aggressive news reporting. This, in turn, heightened public 
understanding of, and sympathy for, the black freedom struggle.26 
The events leading to the decision in New York Times v. Sullivan 
erupted on March 29, 1960, when the New York Times ran a full-page 
advertisement with the headline “Heed Their Rising voices.” The authors 
of the advertisement were the members of the Committee to Defend Martin 
luther King and the Struggle for Freedom in the South. Their intention 
was to raise funds for the legal defense of the civil rights leader, who 
Alabama authorities had arrested on fallacious charges of tax evasion. 
“Heed Their Rising voices” highlighted the brutal repression of black 
protesters engaged in nonviolent protest. This “unprecedented wave of 
terror” included “truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas” 
surrounding the Alabama State College in Montgomery and padlocking 
the doors of its dining hall in an effort to starve student demonstrators 
into surrender.27
Although the advertisement did not mention him by name, Montgomery 
police commissioner l. b. Sullivan filed a libel suit against the newspaper 
and four black ministers named in the advertisement. A Montgomery 
County jury awarded Sullivan $500,000, a decision upheld by the Ala-
bama Supreme Court. The case then made its way to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. On March 9, 1964, Justice William brennan delivered the opinion 
of the court, which overturned the earlier ruling. breaking with historical 
tradition, the court ruled that the First Amendment protection of freedom 
of speech applied to libel cases. According to brennan, the Constitution 
sanctioned “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” speech, including “vehe-
ment, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government 
and public officials.” The application of the First Amendment led the 
Court to raise the burden of proof in libel cases through the introduction 
25. Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 263–64; Edwards v. South Carolina, 
372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27. New York Times, Mar. 29, 1960.
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of the “actual malice” standard. This new standard made it necessary for 
a plaintiff to prove that the author of a statement knew that it was false 
or acted in “reckless disregard” of the truth. Although the decision in 
New York Times v. Sullivan applied specifically to statements made about 
public officials, it demonstrated the commitment of the Warren Court to 
uphold the First Amendment’s protection of political debate.28
The lessons of recent history also warned black activists that it was 
minorities who most stood to lose from any restriction on constitutional 
liberties. Only four years before the Stoner controversy, the conservative 
backlash to the radical black protest of the late 1960s had resulted in 
the federal government curtailing the rights of freedom of speech and 
assembly. in July 1967, police arrested H. Rap brown of the Student 
Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) for inciting a race riot 
that erupted on the streets of Cambridge, Maryland. brown had only 
hours before the outbreak of the disorder declared at a civil rights rally 
that, “if Cambridge doesn’t come around, Cambridge got to be burned 
down.” The following year, Congress passed an amendment to the new 
Civil Rights Act that made it illegal to cross state lines and make speeches 
with the intent “to incite, organize, promote, encourage, participate in, and 
carry on a riot.” in criminalizing militant black protest, the Rap brown 
Amendment, as commentators labelled it, represented a clear warning 
even to more moderate civil rights activists that political dissenters were 
often the first victims of any restrictions on First Amendment rights.29 
Civil rights activists therefore supported unrestricted freedom of speech 
because they saw it as essential to the success of their struggle against 
white racism. 
ironically, their assertion that the Constitution allowed all citizens to 
express publicly ideas or opinions that others might find offensive some-
times forced them to defend the rights of their bitterest political enemies 
to the same freedoms. in 1961, two of Stoner’s associates in the NSRP, 
Robert lyons and edward Fields, attempted to hold a rally in the small 
town of Fairfield, Alabama. A local court granted Mayor Claude Smithson 
an ex parte injunction—one issued without a hearing—against lyons and 
Fields on the grounds that they could incite a race riot. The two men 
28. Michal R. belknap, The Supreme Court under Earl Warren, 1953–1969 (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 2005), 191–92; David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: W. 
Morrow, 1986), 131, 135. The most extensive analysis of New York Times v. Sullivan is 
Anthony lewis, Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (New York: 
Random House, 1991).
29. bruce D’Arcus, “Protest, Scale, and Publicity: The Fbi and the H. Rap brown Act,” 
Antipode 35 (Sep. 2003): 718–41. 
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nonetheless attempted to distribute copies of their organization’s racist 
organ, The Thunderbolt, to local townspeople. Arrested by the police, 
they appeared before the same judge who had issued the injunction against 
them. The court found them both guilty of violating the injunction and 
sentenced them to fines of $50 each and five days in prison.30 
During the desegregation crisis, the AClU had unfailingly attempted 
to uphold the First-Amendment rights of white racists. Consistent with 
that policy, it launched an appeal to the Supreme Court on behalf of the 
two NSRP members, claiming that the injunction was an unconstitutional 
prior restraint on their rights of freedom of speech and assembly. The 
AClU’s executive director, John de J. Pemberton Jr., emphasized that the 
primary motivation for the appeal was less a concern for lyons and Fields 
than the need to protect against courts issuing similar injunctions against 
civil rights demonstrations. in his opinion, “if the Supreme Court rules 
that such injunctions cannot be used to block free speech and association, 
one of the major obstacles to increased effectiveness of Negro and white 
opposition to racial discrimination will have been overcome.”31
Although the actions of the AClU were in accordance with established 
policy, what was more surprising was that the NAACP legal Defense 
and educational Fund should also file an amicus brief on behalf of Fields 
and lyons. Neither the prosecution nor the NSRP activists—no doubt 
embarrassed and repelled by the situation—assented to the NAACP acting 
as a friend of the court in the case. However, the court did grant permis-
sion. The brief filed by NAACP lawyer Jack Greenberg stated that, while 
his organization opposed the NSRP, it worried that should the Supreme 
Court uphold the convictions it would open the way to other restrictions 
on the freedoms of speech and assembly, including those enjoyed by civil 
rights activists. According to Greenberg, some courts were already citing 
the case as precedent for the conviction of civil rights demonstrators who 
violated restraining orders issued without their having an opportunity to 
contest them. A decision by the Supreme Court to uphold the original 
ruling could “seriously impede the movement for equal rights now cur-
rent in the nation.” in December 1963, the Supreme Court overturned 
the convictions of Fields and lyons on the narrow grounds that their 
handing out copies of The Thunderbolt did not constitute a violation of 
the injunction against an NSRP rally.32 Although the case did not repre-
30. George M. Snyder, Corporal, intelligence Unit, Maryland State Police, to Wesley Mc-
Cune, Aug. 21, 1964, box 246, Group Research Archives; Denver Post, Oct. 12, 1961.
31. Civil Liberties 211 (Nov. 1963), clipping, box 246, Group Research Archives; 
Washington Evening Star, Dec. 12, 1963; Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1963; New York 
Times, Dec. 12, 1963; Birmingham Post-Herald, Dec. 12, 1963.
32. Fields v. City of Fairfield, 375 U.S. 248 (1963) (per curiam); Labor, Dec. 28, 
1963.
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sent a complete victory for civil rights activists, it did demonstrate how 
their desire to promote liberal interpretations of First Amendment rights 
paradoxically facilitated the cause of their political foes.
In contrast to black civil rights organizations such as the NAACP, Jew-
ish defense groups faced greater challenges in reaching consensus on the 
appropriate strategic response to hate speech. The issue was a source of 
both inter- and intra-organizational dissension. In broad terms, activists 
divided over the cautious tactics of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) 
and the more confrontational stance of the American Jewish Congress, 
ADL, and Jewish War Veterans. 
The AJC, founded in 1906 by acculturated Jews of central European 
background, had for decades steered clear of direct confrontation with 
political extremists such as Stoner. Instead, the organization implemented 
a policy of containment known as the “quarantine strategy.” The inten-
tion was to avoid public dialogue with the far right that, the AJC feared, 
would confer on the extremists a greater degree of political legitimacy. 
A direct challenge to hate speech further risked white racists turning the 
situation to their political advantage by portraying themselves to the 
public as martyrs denied their constitutional rights. “Every hatemonger 
alleges that attempts are being made to deny him freedom of speech,” 
observed Dr. S. Andhil Fineberg, one of the architects of the quarantine 
strategy. “When such a denial actually occurs, it brings to the bigot’s 
support many conscientious citizens who detest his views—genuine lib-
erals to whom freedom of speech is inviolate.”33 According to historian 
Marianne Sanua, the AJC was also concerned that restricting its political 
enemies’ freedom of speech could prove counterproductive, impeding 
the ability of minorities to promote unpopular causes, such as Jewish 
support for Israel.34 
During the 1960s, the AJC deployed the quarantine strategy against 
such prominent antisemites as John Crommelin and American Nazi Party 
leader George Lincoln Rockwell. The organization also applied a longer-
term plan of promoting community education programs to foster racial 
and religious tolerance. “In the long run,” concluded one of its reports, 
“the most effective defense against unsound ideas is more speech and more 
ideas, in the certain knowledge that ultimately truth will triumph.”35
33. S. Andhil Fineberg, “The Quarantine Treatment,” in The Hate Reader, ed. Edwin 
S. Newman (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1964), 114.
34. Marianne R. Sanua, Let Us Prove Strong: The American Jewish Committee, 
1945–2006 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England/Brandeis University Press, 
2007), 254–55.
35. “Anti-Semitism in the U.S. and Problems in Dealing With it,” Executive Board 
Meeting, Oct. 28–30, 1960, Antisemitism/AJC file, AJC Subject Files Collection, Reports
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Scholars often assume that there was a consensus among Jewish de-
fense agencies in support of the quarantine strategy. David Hamlin, for 
example, refers to it as the “time-honored and well-tested position” of 
Jewish groups.36 This, however, was not entirely true even of the AJC. 
Although the quarantine strategy was an official policy of the Commit-
tee, circumstances sometimes compelled the organization to take a more 
interventionist position on hate speech. Apprehension that far-right fanat-
ics would use public forums to incite violence against racial and religious 
minorities on occasion led the AJC to abandon caution. One example of 
this was the organization’s reaction to John Kasper, the rabble-rousing 
segregationist who provoked violent resistance to school desegregation 
in several southern communities during the late 1950s. The AJC collabo-
rated with local and state authorities in Tennessee and Florida to expose 
Kasper’s former close friendships with African Americans and thereby 
ruin his reputation as a segregationist leader.37 
In contrast to the gradualism of the AJC, other Jewish defense agencies 
assumed a more direct stance on hate speech. These organizations included 
the American Jewish Congress, founded in 1918 by Jews of eastern Eu-
ropean descent, as well those from central European backgrounds who 
favored a more aggressive, Zionist-oriented approach to Jewish issues; and 
the ADL, established in the wake of the 1915 lynching of Leo Frank as 
an offshoot of the B’nai B’rith fraternal order. Reflecting their departure 
from AJC strictures, both groups had from their inception campaigned 
for censorship of antisemitic literature and speech.38 
The activities of the American Jewish Congress and the ADL increased 
immediately after World War II, a time when public exposure of the 
Holocaust had undermined popular tolerance of antisemitism and al-
lowed Jews to establish a more assertive claim to inclusion in American 
society. The American Jewish Congress, for instance, participated in 
protests against public addresses by notorious antisemite Gerald L. K. 
and memoranda on anti-Semitism in America and AJC’s work to combat it, 1960–1962, 
American Jewish Committee Archives, available online at http://ajcarchives.org/AJCArchive/
DigitalArchive.aspx (accessed Nov. 19, 2007).
36. David Hamlin, The Nazi/Skokie Conflict: A Civil Liberties Battle (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1980), 108. See also Sanua, Let Us Prove Strong, 252–53.
37. Naomi W. Cohen, Not Free to Desist: The American Jewish Committee, 1906–1966 
(Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1972), 396. 
38. The ADL, for instance, participated in protests against derogatory stereotypes of 
Jews in theater productions during the 1910s. See Harley Erdman, Staging the Jew: The 
Performance of an American Ethnicity, 1860–1920 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1997), 150–59.
282 A M E R I C A N  J E W I S H  H I S T O R Y
Smith in los Angeles during 1945.39 in a case that anticipated the later 
Stoner incident, the ADl filed a petition with the FCC in 1946 protest-
ing radio appearances by Mississippi Klansman lycurgus Spinks, who 
was campaigning for the state governorship. Spinks was a theatrical 
racist who wore his silver hair to his shoulders and proclaimed Jesus 
was a Klansman.40 His verbal assaults on racial and religious minorities 
included the accusation that the Russian Revolution was a conspiracy 
by “hook-nosed Jews from New York and london and a few of those 
niggers i’m supposed to sleep with.”41 The ADl argued that Spinks’ 
invective violated the public interest responsibilities of the radio stations 
on which he appeared. Although the FCC upheld the petition, the ADl 
declined the opportunity to refute Spinks on air, as this would give greater 
legitimacy to a fringe candidate. When voters went to the polls, Spinks 
won only 1.5 percent of the vote.42 
The two more assertive Jewish defense agencies had also attempted 
to prohibit the mail distribution of hate literature. in the early 1940s, 
the American Jewish Congress supported House bill 2328, which would 
have empowered the postmaster general to outlaw material containing 
“defamatory and false statements” based on race or religion.43 Among 
the groups that successfully lobbied against the bill was the AJC, a clear 
indication of how the issue of hate speech divided Jewish defense agen-
cies.44 The failure of the bill did not dissuade the ADl from later peti-
tioning federal authorities to ban circulation of a newsletter produced by 
antisemitic preacher and former Stoner ally Gordon Winrod, a proposal 
that also met with rejection.45
Although the ADl and American Jewish Congress had on occasion 
collaborated with the AJC in applying the quarantine strategy, they had 
at best been reluctant partners. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
the two organizations supported quarantine in instances where a more 
39. David J. leonard, “‘The little Fuehrer invades los Angeles’: The emergence of 
a black-Jewish Coalition After World War ii,” American Jewish History 92 (Mar. 2004): 
81–102.
40. Cedar Rapids (iA) Gazette, Sep. 3, 1949; Lowell (MA) Sun, Aug. 24, 1949.
41. Chicago Defender, Sep. 23, 1944.
42. Arnold Forster, Square One: A Memoir (New York: Donald i. Fine, inc., 1988), 
83–84.
43. Will Maslow, “Prejudice, Discrimination, and the law,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 275 (May 1951): 9–17;  “Group libel laws: Abor-
tive efforts to Combat Hate Propaganda,” Yale Law Journal 61 (Feb. 1952): 252–63.
44. Samuel Walker, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy (lincoln 
and london: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), 85.
45. ADL Bulletin 28 (Sep. 1971): 3–4.
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direct approach threatened the security of racial and religious minori-
ties. This was the case, for instance, with George lincoln Rockwell.46 
The ADl and American Jewish Congress also recognized that support 
for restrictions on freedom of speech could compromise civil rights ac-
tivism. During the 1950s, several southern states attempted to repress 
the NAACP by forcing it to release its membership lists, exposing those 
whose names appeared to intimidation and violence. When the Alabama 
NAACP refused to comply, state authorities imposed an outright ban on 
the organization. To defend the NAACP, with which it had a close alli-
ance, the American Jewish Congress tactically retreated from attempting 
to censor racist speech, promoting instead the entitlement of all Americans 
to “the free exercise of the right to speak without fear of retribution, and 
to the right of voluntary association and free assembly.”47 During the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, when the terrorist campaigns of the far right 
against southern Jews made safety a premium, the use of quarantine was 
an appropriate strategy. by the late 1960s, however, both the American 
Jewish Congress and the ADl would revert, for reasons explained below, 
to a more aggressive stance on hate speech. 
Given their earlier caution about censorship of white racists, the 
confrontational attitude of some civil rights groups toward the Stoner 
campaign commercial represented a tactical shift on the hate speech is-
sue. The effort to ban further broadcasts of the commercial demonstrated 
an alternative conviction that unrestricted freedom of speech posed a 
potential threat, rather than a measure to protect, equality. 
The effort to silence Stoner raises some crucial issues. First, how do we 
account for the timing of the decision to shift tactics? Civil rights organi-
zations had wrestled with the hate speech issue for years. Stoner himself 
had long used public addresses to make abusive statements about racial 
and religious minorities. Therefore, there was nothing new or surprising 
about the language used in the commercial. Nonetheless, it led some civil 
rights groups to shift from their strategic support of unrestricted freedom 
of speech toward a principled stand against public expressions of hate. 
Second, why did some black and Jewish organizations sign the petition 
to the FCC while others refrained from confronting Stoner? The Southern 
Christian leadership Conference, for instance, although based in Atlanta, 
did not become involved in the dispute. This lack of consensus suggests 
that the hate speech issue was representative of the broader fracturing 
of the civil rights coalition in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
46. On the difficulty of maintaining cross-organizational support for quarantining 
Rockwell, see Frederick J. Simonelli, American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the 
American Nazi Party (Urbana and Chicago: University of illinois Press, 1999), 63–65.
47. Congress Weekly, Oct. 22, 1956, 4.
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Unfortunately, neither the organizational records of the NAACP and 
ADl nor the published scholarship on the two civil rights groups provides 
much insight into why they mobilized against Stoner.48 (it should be noted 
that the American Jewish Congress, though generally sharing the position 
taken by the ADl and the NAACP in their action against Stoner, did not 
participate in the effort because it was mainly conducted by local activ-
ists and the organization had no office in Atlanta). The relative absence 
of evidence accounting for the shift in policy is problematic, but it is 
possible to point toward a tentative explanation. A closer look at both 
broader shifts in civil rights activism and the distinctive characteristics 
of the Stoner campaign offer some clues.
The immediate catalyst for the ADl and NAACP petition was Stoner’s 
unprecedented use of explicitly racist language in a campaign commercial. 
Television provided Stoner with the means to communicate his message 
to millions of people, the potential impact of which no one could predict. 
The senatorial race of 1972 was not the first time that Stoner had run 
for public office, but he had not in the past possessed access to such a 
powerful medium through which to communicate his message. With little 
media profile, Stoner did not represent a serious threat. However, with 
the potential to appear in every living room across the state, he posed 
much more of a menace. 
Civil rights groups had refrained from a censorship struggle with Stoner 
when he stood as a candidate in the Georgia gubernatorial election two 
years earlier. Declaring his candidacy in that contest in May 1970, Stoner 
promised a “program of unity and love,” only to expose his divisiveness 
and hatred by adding the clause “for whites.”49 Stoner’s platform stressed 
his commitment not only to resist further federal intervention in southern 
race relations, but also to repeal the legislative revolution of the 1960s. 
As he would later do in his senatorial campaign, Stoner announced his 
intention to preserve school segregation by opposing busing, improving 
the funding of private academies, and restricting welfare to poor whites. 
He also declared his determination to resist federal mandates such as 
the Supreme Court’s prohibition of officially sponsored school prayer 
in Engel v. Vitale (1962), which he described as an encroachment upon 
48. Neither of the most recent studies of the NAACP, for instance, discuss the issue of 
hate speech. See Gilbert Jonas, Freedom’s Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle Against 
Racism in America, 1909–1969 (New York: Routledge, 2005); and Manfred berg, Ticket 
to Freedom: The NAACP and the Struggle for Black Political Integration (Gainesville: 
University Press of Florida, 2005). No scholar has to date written an organizational his-
tory of the ADl. 
49. The Thunderbolt (Jun. 1970): 1; Savannah Morning News, May 19, 1970; Chicago 
Defender, Jun. 3, 1970; Wall Street Journal, Sep. 1, 1970.
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cherished rights and traditions. The populist tone of the campaign in-
cluded condemnation both of federal policymakers and the metropolitan 
elite in Atlanta who, Stoner claimed, denied rural and small-town voters 
a representative voice in state politics.50
State newspapers and television stations reprehended Stoner for his 
crude racial demagoguery, but recognized his constitutional right to free-
dom of expression. According to the Atlanta Journal, public exposure 
would only serve to discredit Stoner, since “he will sensitize masses of 
people to just how vulgar and profane their views sound when they are 
expressed by a real racist.”51 in a separate editorial, the paper also evoked 
Cold War politics by proclaiming that any impingement on constitutional 
liberties, even in order to combat bigotry, would compromise the United 
States’ status as leader of the free world. As the paper rather histrioni-
cally put it, “the Kremlin would be delighted if our country eliminated 
the right of dissent.”52
Apprehension about the Stoner campaign in 1970 eased as a result 
of his failure to find a public forum for his opinions. Stoner himself 
claimed that the media conspired to suppress coverage of his campaign. 
However, the truth was more prosaic: he had no money to publicize his 
cause. Although Stoner ran a series of newspaper advertisements, he 
could not raise the funds for a televised campaign commercial. When 
Atlanta’s WAGA-Tv broadcast a critical editorial piece on Stoner, the 
NSRP issued an appeal for financial support so it could advertise on 
television “a message so dynamic and bold that people will remember it 
100 times longer than any Jew propaganda diatribe.” The funds were not 
forthcoming. edward Fields, who worked as Stoner’s campaign manager, 
conceded: “we have run out of money.”53 Stoner did appear on a televised 
debate between the twelve gubernatorial candidates, but his restrained 
performance elicited no protest. Civil rights groups closely monitored 
the election, but in the circumstances appreciated that any intervention 
on their part would generate the publicity Stoner had otherwise failed 
to attract. The outcome of the Democratic primary on September 9 was 
50. “The White People’s Candidate: J. b. Stoner, ‘Champion of White Supremacy for 
Governor of Georgia,’” 1970, campaign flyer, box 1, folder 2, J. b. Stoner Gubernatorial 
Campaign Collection, MS 21, Wilcox Collection of Contemporary Political Movements, 
Kansas Collection, Kenneth Spencer Research library, University of Kansas, lawrence; 
Atlanta Constitution, Jan. 30 and Sep. 2, 1970.
51. Atlanta Journal, Aug. 14, 1970.
52. ibid., Jul. 30, 1970.
53. edward Fields, “J. b. Stoner for Governor Committee,” campaign newsletter, n.d.; 
edward Fields, “J. b. Stoner for Governor Committee: Sabotage Plot Fails,” campaign 
newsletter, n.d., both in box 1, folder 2, Stoner Gubernatorial Campaign Collection. 
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a resounding success for racial moderates, with Jimmy Carter winning 
48.7 percent of the vote. Stoner placed fifth with a feeble 2.2 percent, a 
position made more humiliating by his loss of fourth place to an African 
American candidate, the noted Albany, Georgia, attorney C. b. King.54
Two years later, the publicity generated by Stoner posed a more im-
mediate danger to racial and religious minorities and compelled inter-
ventionist action on the part of the ADl and NAACP. While the change 
in policy toward Stoner occurred in part because of the threat posed by 
his greater access to the electorate, it also reflected a broader redirection 
of civil rights activism. The purpose of the direct action protests of the 
1960s was to expose the violent racism of white southerners to the rest 
of the nation, creating public pressure on an otherwise reluctant federal 
government to intervene in support of the demonstrators. When the 
police used dogs and fire hoses on black protesters during the Southern 
Christian leadership Conference campaign in birmingham in 1963, it 
elicited angry condemnations from the press and politicians across the 
country.55 by the early 1970s, there was less strategic need for the civil 
rights movement to publicize white racism. The movement had already 
demolished the legal foundations of Jim Crow and established many 
fundamental rights and protections for African Americans. With less 
immediate need to protect their own freedom of speech, civil rights or-
ganizations may therefore have worried less about the repercussions of 
censoring their political opponents.
The inclusion of the ADl in the coalition against Stoner also demon-
strates how changing political circumstances encouraged Jewish defense 
agencies to take a more direct stand against hate speakers. The quar-
antine strategy served Jews well during the school desegregation crisis 
when antisemitism reached unprecedented levels in the southern states. 
Jews were a small and marginal group in southern society—less than 
one percent of the population—and a more direct challenge to racial and 
religious bigots risked violent reprisal. The terrorist attacks on southern 
synagogues during the late 1950s were still fresh in the memory of most 
Jews in the region.56 However, by the early 1970s the civil rights move-
ment and the rise to power of white racial moderates had eroded the 
political strength of militants such as Stoner. The election of Sam Massell, 
a Jew, as mayor of Atlanta in October 1969 symbolized a new era of 
54. Atlanta Constitution, Sep. 11, 1970; Jul. 6, 1971.
55. See, for example, Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: The South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1987), 137–39.
56. The terrorist attacks on Jewish institutions are the subject of Melissa Fay Greene, 
The Temple Bombing (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996).
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social and political inclusion for Jews in the American South. This new 
political climate encouraged Jews to take a more public stand against 
the far right. The ADl had accepted the quarantine strategy only as a 
political expediency. When circumstances allowed, it willingly reverted 
to a more confrontational policy against hate speakers.57
The reassertion of a more confrontational policy on hate speech had 
started in the late 1960s. Two years before the Stoner incident, the FCC 
revoked the broadcasting license of fundamentalist preacher Carl Mcin-
tire in response to protests by numerous groups representing minority 
interests, including the AJC and the NAACP. Mcintire had transmitted 
his racially and religiously reactionary ideology over the airwaves since 
1965 when he established the WXUR radio station in Media, Pennsyl-
vania. However, his refusal to present alternate points of view enabled 
civil rights organizations to challenge his broadcasting license under the 
terms of the Fairness Doctrine. The success of this campaign may have 
emboldened black and Jewish activists to confront Stoner shortly there-
after.58 This shift toward support of political censorship also coincided 
with the efforts of the Nixon administration to crack down on political 
extremism. Federal repression of militants provided an opportune moment 
for civil rights groups to push for restrictions on the First Amendment 
rights of their adversaries.59 The societal changes wrought by the civil 
rights revolution also meant that by the early 1970s explicit expressions 
of racism were no longer socially or politically acceptable.
Further political developments reshaped policy on hate speech. Civil 
rights groups were concerned that the Stoner campaign in 1972 was 
symptomatic of a resurgence of the far right. The ADl cited the presiden-
tial campaign of American Party candidate John Schmitz as evidence.60 
Moreover, the ADl feared that the resurrection of the far right came at 
a time when the atrocities committed against Jews during World War ii 
57. For more on the career of Sam Massell, see eli N. evans, The Provincials: A Personal 
History of Jews in the South (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 225–54.
58. ADL Bulletin 29 (Nov. 1972): 4; Heather Hendershot, “God’s Angriest Man: Carl 
Mcintire, Cold War Fundamentalism, and Right-Wing broadcasting,” American Quarterly 
59 (Jun. 2007): 373–96. The American Jewish Committee also drew on the successful 
campaign against Mcintire when it lobbied for the cancellation of Bridget Loves Bernie, 
a comedy show about the marriage between a Catholic woman and a Jewish man. See 
Sanua, Let Us Prove Strong, 275.
59. For more information on the federal attack on political dissidents, see Dean J. Kot-
lowski, Nixon’s Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy (Cambridge, MA and london: 
Harvard University Press, 2001) and David Cunningham, There’s Something Happening 
Here: The New Left, the Klan, and FBI Counterintelligence (berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2004).
60. ADL Bulletin 29 (Dec. 1972): 5.
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were receding in the public consciousness. The generation of Americans 
that grew to adulthood after the war was less aware, according to the 
ADl, of what the racial demagoguery of men like Stoner could lead to if 
not confronted. even some of those for whom the Holocaust was within 
living memory were far too complacent about the far right. As Arnold 
Forster and benjamin epstein of the ADl asserted, although there was 
nothing novel about the hatred espoused by Stoner, “what is new is the 
indifference manifest by so many to the continued existence of this ancient 
plague.” Forster and epstein concluded that the readiness of the media 
to provide Stoner with a public forum reflected the “large measure of 
indifference” to racial and religious prejudice “abroad in our land.”61 
These concerns had led the ADl by the late 1960s to conclude that it 
must campaign for censorship of broadcasts “that are incitements, that 
are inflammatory, that are bigoted.” The Stoner campaign commercial 
presented an opportune moment to test its newly reassertive policy.62 The 
cultural and political shifts of the late 1960s and early 1970s, coupled 
with the bellicose campaign strategy pursued by Stoner, therefore created 
the context for a showdown on the hate speech issue. What remained 
uncertain was the result of that confrontation.
The ADl and NAACP faced a difficult task in attempting to censor 
Stoner in 1972 for two reasons. First, the power of federal law appeared 
to protect Stoner from censorship. The Communications Act of 1934 
not only compelled broadcasters to provide all political candidates with 
equal time on air, but also prohibited their imposing conditions on the 
content of campaign commercials. its purpose was to facilitate participa-
tory democracy by presenting voters with a panoply of political opinion, 
including that of candidates outside the main parties. The provisions of 
the law were strengthened only a year before the senatorial race by the 
Federal election Campaign Act, which required broadcasters to offer 
“reasonable access” to candidates for federal office.63 Stoner further 
benefited from federal protection in the form of the Fairness Doctrine. 
established by the Federal Communications Commission in 1949, the 
Fairness Doctrine obliged broadcast licensees to present contrasting points 
of view on controversial matters of public importance. As was true of 
the Communications Act of 1934, the federal government had fortified 
61. Arnold Forster and benjamin R. epstein, The New Antisemitism (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1974), 303, 307, 324.
62. benjamin R. epstein, quoted in “How Free is Free Speech?” ADL Bulletin 26 
(Mar. 1969): 4.
63. Peter b. Orlik, Electronic Media Criticism: Applied Perspectives, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, 
NJ: lawrence erlbaum Associates, 2001), 198–99.
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the legality of the Fairness Doctrine only shortly before the Stoner cam-
paign commercial, in this case because of the Supreme Court decision 
in Red Lion Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission 
(1969).64
The second reason for the difficulty, as previously discussed, was that 
the libertarian attitude of the courts toward freedom of speech benefited 
both proponents and opponents of civil rights reform. The enhancement of 
First Amendment protections in Supreme Court cases such as Edwards v. 
South Carolina and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan bolstered the forces 
of racial liberalism. Conversely, the same expansionist interpretation of 
the First Amendment also protected hate speakers from prosecution. 
The case with the most direct implications for the Stoner incident 
was Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), in which the Supreme Court over-
turned the conviction of a Cincinnati Klansman in a case that in effect 
abolished the “clear and present danger” test for free speech established 
half a century earlier in Schenck v. United States (1919). Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes had attempted to impose a constitutional barrier to 
the repression of free speech by stating that such action was only legally 
justified when the words used were “of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”65 During the decades that followed, 
however, the broad interpretation of this standard resulted in significant 
governmental suppression of political dissent, especially during the Mc-
Carthyite witch-hunting of the 1940s and 1950s. However, a series of 
cases culminating in Brandenburg led to a substantial expansion of First 
Amendment protections. brandenburg had a clear bearing on the Stoner 
case since it concerned a Klan leader who used the same racially deroga-
tory language and publicly advocated similar policies, such as the forcible 
repatriation of African Americans and Jews. The Court overturned his 
conviction under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism law, concluding that 
the First Amendment protected the right to express racially or religiously 
inflammatory opinions so long as such language did not serve as a direct 
means to incite violence.66 
The ADl and NAACP legal challenge asked the FCC to determine 
that the Stoner commercial represented a “clear and present danger” to 
the community, consistent with the criterion to restrict freedom of speech 
64. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 
367 (1969). For more on the Fairness Doctrine, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker and lucas 
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65. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
66. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). For a fuller discussion of the liberaliza-
tion of freedom of speech by the Supreme Court, see Walker, Hate Speech.
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established in Schenck v. United States but apparently abandoned in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio. lonnie King of the NAACP evoked Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’ famous opinion in Schenck by claiming Stoner’s efforts 
to create public disorder were comparable to “a man falsely shouting 
fire in a theater and causing a panic.” The ADl and NAACP petition 
significantly emphasized that the language used by Stoner could not only 
incite white racists into violent acts against African Americans, but also 
cause blacks to take retributive measures against the stations that aired 
the commercial. According to the signatories, the Stoner campaign com-
mercial posed “a serious and imminent threat to the safety and well being 
of the stations which air it and to the community at large.” indeed, the 
broadcast later resulted in anonymous threats to bomb both stations.67
The NAACP and ADl did not attempt to prove that Stoner’s use of ra-
cial pejoratives and crude stereotyping of black male sexuality constituted 
an act of group slander. However, the two civil rights organizations did 
endeavor to show that the commercial could cause psychological harm. 
The petitioners included the expert testimony of Dr. Alex Robertson, 
a pediatrician at Georgia Medical College, who opined that exposure 
to the racial epithets that Stoner uttered would prove “detrimental to 
the normal psychological development of children.”68 This strategy was 
consistent with the NAACP’s use in Brown v. Board of Education of a 
study by psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark demonstrating the 
mental harm caused by racism.69
On August 3, 1972, the FCC issued its decision on the Stoner com-
mercial. it ruled that the ADl and NAACP had failed to offer sufficient 
evidence that the language used by Stoner would directly induce acts of 
violent lawlessness. in the absence of a “clear and present danger,” the 
FCC concluded that the First Amendment protected Stoner from censor-
ship.70 The ADl and NAACP contemplated asking a federal court of 
appeal to overturn the decision, but concluded that this risked generating 
further publicity for Stoner.71
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68. lonnie King, Rev. Joe boone, and Stuart lewengrub to William b. Ray, Chief, 
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Stoner was understandably elated with the FCC ruling, interpreting it 
as a sign that his segregationist crusade had divine sanction. “i think that 
God has blessed me,” he beamed to reporters. “God has protected me 
from the Jews and the niggers who were trying to take my constitutional 
rights of free speech away from me.”72 He seized on the FCC decision to 
reaffirm his opinion that, “even for short pleasure with white women, 
niggers will risk life and limb.”73 These statements were characteristic of 
the way Stoner punctuated every remark about African Americans with 
the use of vile racial epithets and references to their supposedly preda-
tory sexual instincts. 
The FCC ruling similarly emboldened Stoner to believe he could act 
with impunity in employing racial and religious slurs against his politi-
cal opponents. When WSb-Tv in Atlanta broadcast a debate between 
the candidates in the senatorial race, Stoner refused to shake hands 
with black activist Hosea Williams of the Southern Christian leadership 
Conference and accused him on air of conspiring to deny jobs to white 
workers. He also retaliated against Mayor Massell by accusing him of 
being a “Christ-killing, race-mixing, Jew gangster.”74
Despite his claims to the contrary, the outcome of the Democratic 
primary demonstrated that Stoner’s election to public office was not 
part of the divine plan. Stoner came in fifth of thirteen candidates with 
40,675 votes, 5.7 percent of the total. The overwhelming majority of his 
support, 27,821 votes, came from rural areas. While his election show-
ing was less than spectacular, it represented a substantial improvement 
on Stoner’s previous attempt to win public office, when he polled only 
18,000 votes, 2.2 percent of the total, in the 1970 Georgia gubernatorial 
race.75 Although electoral statistics do not provide an explanation for 
the motivations of voters, it is possible that the upsurge in support for 
Stoner was due in part to the much-publicized controversy surrounding 
his campaign commercial. The ADl considered it “inconceivable” that, 
“in this day and age,” Stoner should attract so many votes.76
Whether or not Stoner profited from the public controversy over the 
campaign commercial is impossible to determine. The efforts of the ADl 
72. ibid.
73. Capital Times (Madison, Wi), Aug. 4, 1972.
74. Stuart lewengrub, “The Hate Campaign,” ADL Bulletin 29 (Oct. 1972): 7–8; 
Atlanta Journal, Aug. 2, 1972.
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folder 15, Cohen Papers. 
292 A M E R I C A N  J E W I S H  H I S T O R Y
and NAACP to restrict his freedom of speech may ironically have pro-
vided his campaign with greater media exposure than it would otherwise 
have received. local, national, and even international media covered 
the controversy, generating countless column-inches of free publicity for 
Stoner.77 even so, ADl officials insisted with some legitimacy that the 
commercial “was already a front-page and headline item” before they 
and the NAACP filed their petition.78 Television and radio stations had 
according to one estimate broadcast it more than one hundred times 
before the intervention of civil rights organizations, meaning that Stoner’s 
message had already reached a mass audience.79 in the final analysis, 
the extent to which either of these factors influenced support for Stoner 
remains inconclusive since the electoral data tells us how, but not why, 
voters cast their ballots. 
While it is unclear whether the ADl and NAACP unintentionally roused 
popular support for Stoner, the controversy surrounding his campaign 
is replete with irony in other respects. First, the controversy found the 
two sides in the civil rights struggle reversing their relationship toward 
the federal government. During the desegregation crisis, southern whites 
pursued a policy of massive resistance against federal law. Segregationists 
claimed that the Supreme Court had usurped its constitutional authority 
in handing down the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which they 
saw as an attempt to impose desegregation in contravention of individual 
state control of the public school system. These reactionaries similarly 
resisted the liberalization of the law by the Warren Court in other areas 
such as school prayer. However, in responding to the protests against 
the Stoner campaign commercial, the white press and political leadership 
abandoned their strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitution 
and supported the unrestricted right to freedom of speech established by 
the Supreme Court during the preceding two decades. Opposition to the 
unconditional interpretation of freedom of speech came instead from civil 
rights activists. The NAACP and ADl wrote to a number of newspapers 
protesting their freedom-of-speech editorial line.80
Second, the controversy illustrates the argument made by historian 
eckard Toy that hate groups paradoxically persecute racial and religious 
77. For an example of international news coverage, see The Times (london), Aug. 4, 
1972.
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minorities while portraying themselves as victims.81 During the course 
of the civil rights revolution, the more politically astute white southern 
racists started to understand that their best means to defend Jim Crow 
practices was to shift the terms of public debate away from race. explicitly 
racist rhetoric had lost much of its cultural and intellectual legitimacy by 
the late 1950s and early 1960s. For that reason, a growing number of 
segregationists abandoned their emphasis on the supposed inferiority of 
African Americans and instead attempted to rationalize their resistance 
to reform by claiming that they were merely protecting their own rights 
to freedom of choice about who shared classrooms with their children or 
bought homes in their neighborhood. According to this line of reasoning, 
the federal government increased opportunity for African Americans only 
by curtailing the citizenship rights of whites.82 
While moderate segregationists recognized the need to choose between 
their emphasis on race on the one hand and the denial of their rights 
on the other, Stoner attempted to straddle these rhetorical strategies. He 
saw no contradiction between his incorporation of the language of white 
victimization and his stress on racist arguments to justify the denial of 
African Americans’ constitutional rights. Stoner used the most offensive 
of words to demean African Americans, emphasizing through repetition 
his hatred of them and rejection of their basic humanity. He also drew 
on malicious stereotypes of black males as violent criminals and sexual 
predators to stress that African Americans posed a threat to a suppos-
edly civilized society. Although his language abused African Americans, 
his rhetoric represented whites as victims. The political establishment 
both at the federal and state level had, in Stoner’s opinion, betrayed the 
electorate they were supposed to represent by implementing laws that 
undermined white privilege. This legislation, he claimed, rendered whites 
vulnerable to the predatory advances of African Americans.
Third, although Stoner claimed ordinary whites no longer possessed a 
representative voice in public life, he communicated his message through 
the medium of mass communications. While Stoner claimed he was the 
victim of a tyrannical political establishment, he used the protection of 
the state to address the electorate without restriction. Stoner ironically 
relied on the permissive policies of the FCC to make public his claim 
that the government in Washington was a dictatorship. 
81. eckard v. Toy Jr., “Right-Wing extremism from the Ku Klux Klan to the Order, 
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Fourth, what allowed Stoner to denounce racial equality in such inflam-
matory terms was an expansive interpretation of freedom of speech that 
owed much to the influence of the civil rights movement. it was during 
the 1950s and 1960s that the Warren Court facilitated black protest by 
including offensive and provocative language under the protection of the 
First Amendment. That protection now provided Stoner with the means 
to employ hate speech against African Americans. in a further twist, one 
of the members of the FCC board that ruled in favor of Stoner’s right 
to freedom of speech was the future executive director of the NAACP, 
benjamin l. Hooks. According to Hooks, African Americans must not 
let “the emotions of the moment blind them” to the broader importance 
of protecting First Amendment rights that had proved so important to 
the advance of racial egalitarianism. banning the campaign commercial 
might offer temporary appeasement to African Americans, but in the 
longer term it was more likely to cause them harm.83 
The efforts of black and Jewish organizations to restrict the hate speech of 
J. b. Stoner ended in failure. During the 1970s, the white supremacist 
ran for public office on several further occasions, using the protection 
of federal power to disparage racial and religious minorities in crudely 
offensive terms. in 1974, for instance, a federal judge ruled that public 
officials in Macon and Augusta could not prohibit the pasting of posters 
produced by Stoner, who was running for the lieutenant governorship of 
Georgia, on city buses. Stoner secured 73,000 votes, around nine per-
cent of the total, in that election.84 Four years later, Stoner ran against 
incumbent George busbee for the Georgia governorship. That March, 
busbee had signed the Georgia Fair employment Practices Act into law. 
Stoner made the repeal of the new legislation the focus of his election bid. 
One of his television campaign commercials claimed that if busbee was 
re-elected he would enact further laws that “take from the whites and 
give to the Niggers.”85 Despite a petition from Atlanta NAACP leader 
Julian bond, the FCC reaffirmed that Stoner’s use of racially deroga-
tory language in his campaign commercials did not constitute a “clear 
and present danger” to the community.86 it is testimony to the residual 
83. Manitowoc (Wi) Herald-Times, Aug. 9, 1972; The Bee (Danville, vA), Aug. 9, 
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power of white racism among rural and small-town voters that he scored 
his most impressive result in this election, securing 71,000 votes or 10 
percent of the total.87 
Although the NAACP attempted to censor Stoner a second time in 
1978, further failure led the organization to revert thereafter to its tradi-
tionally permissive policy on First Amendment rights.88 Significantly, the 
second challenge to Stoner did not receive the support of the ADl. The 
reluctance of the ADl to renew its partnership with the NAACP suggests 
its recognition of failure in the Stoner incident. Five years later, when the 
National Socialist Party of America announced its intention to parade in 
the Chicago suburb of Skokie, the ADl and other Jewish defense orga-
nizations initially recommended a return to their traditional quarantine 
strategy. Although the protests of local Holocaust survivors eventually 
led them to petition for a banning order, the lesson they appeared to have 
learned from the Stoner episode, but then forgotten, was that the courts 
would protect the unlimited right to freedom of speech.89
Despite the efforts to silence Stoner, there was never a serious threat 
that he would win public office. in May 1980, he once more entered the 
Democratic senatorial primary. However, Georgia party officials declared 
him ineligible to run because of his recent conviction for the attempted 
bombing of the bethel baptist Church in birmingham twenty-two years 
earlier.90 Stoner used the appeals process to escape incarceration for 
another three years. When all appeals were exhausted, an Fbi manhunt 
was necessary to finally secure his arrest and imprisonment.91 Released 
from prison in October 1986, Stoner renewed his assault on racial and 
religious minorities with what he called his “Crusade Against Corruption.” 
The campaign focused on the AiDS epidemic, which, Stoner claimed, 
was an act of divine vengeance against “jews and negroids.” He called 
on the federal government to protect whites from the disease by isolat-
ing and then deporting infected minorities.92 Despite the inflammatory 
rhetoric used by Stoner, civil rights groups had learned from their earlier 
failures to restrict his right to freedom of speech and refused to respond 
publicly. Stoner continued to menace racial and religious minorities until 
debilitated by a stroke. He died on April 23, 2005.93
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How serious a threat did Stoner really pose? His crude appeals to 
racial and religious prejudice had appeared anachronistic in the 1950s, 
when massive resistance leaders attempted to legitimate their opposition 
to desegregation by framing it in the context of states’ rights, let alone the 
1970s, when the civil rights revolution had demolished the legal founda-
tions of Jim Crow. even those who resisted civil rights reform wanted 
to dissociate themselves from the lawless extremism of radicals such as 
Stoner. One of the rival candidates in the 1972 senatorial race was ernest 
vandiver, a former governor of Georgia who had threatened to close 
schools and universities rather than admit African American students 
through their doors. Although he was an arch conservative, vandiver 
understood the need in the new political climate to represent himself 
as a rational and respectable candidate by ameliorating his language on 
racial matters. He therefore condemned the Stoner campaign commercial 
as having “offended the honor and dignity of many Georgians,” white 
as well as black.94
Although the coarse language of Stoner did not attract a sizeable share 
of the white electorate, this did not mean that racism was not still an 
important element in southern politics. An opinion poll conducted a year 
before the election revealed that 53 percent of Georgia voters believed 
“public officials don’t care what the people want.”95 Their resentment 
stemmed in substantial measure from federal enforcement of black civil 
rights. While other white candidates in the primary campaign strategically 
distanced themselves from the overt racism of Stoner, they espoused a 
similarly anti-establishment rhetoric rooted in opposition to racial reform. 
The outcome of the Democratic primary demonstrates that many whites 
who did not cast their ballots in support of Stoner still shared some of 
his convictions. Although David Gambrell won the first round with 34 
percent of the vote, he lost the runoff election three weeks later to Sam 
Nunn. Nunn attained 54 percent of the vote by attracting the support 
of rural and small town voters who had cast their ballots in the first 
round for Stoner and vandiver. even though Nunn eschewed the racist 
rhetoric of Stoner, his campaign shared a similar agenda. Nunn promised 
voters that he would “Get Tough in Washington” by restoring states’ 
rights, strengthening law and order, and abolishing the use of busing 
to facilitate school desegregation. While there were crucial distinctions 
between Nunn and Stoner—one was a respectable politician, the other a 
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racial extremist—both hoped to use white resentment of federal reforms 
to win public office.96 
Although Stoner did not win the election, his campaign indirectly 
advanced the interests of white racial conservatism. in condemning his 
extremism, mainstream politicians like vandiver and Nunn made their 
own reactionary positions appear more moderate and reasonable. As a 
letter-writer to the Atlanta Constitution observed of the 1970 gubernato-
rial election, the real menace that Stoner posed was that he “makes all 
the other white racists look good.”97 in an astute commentary on the 
Stoner incident, white moderate newspaperman Hodding Carter observed: 
“Hardly anyone preaches it [white supremacy] anymore—not because 
politicians’ hearts are purer, but because that ploy no longer works.”98 
What did work, as Sam Nunn demonstrated with his emphases on law 
and order and states’ rights, was the use of racially encoded concepts to 
legitimize attacks on minorities. The hate speech of political mavericks 
such as Stoner was ultimately a distraction from this more insidious, 
and ultimately more successful, danger to civil rights reform. Ronald 
Reagan’s references to “welfare queens” and George bush’s notorious 
Willie Horton campaign commercial would demonstrate how, during the 
1980s and beyond, mainstream politicians used implicitly racist messages 
to their electoral advantage.99
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